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THE CASE FOR KURDISH STATEHOOD IN IRAQ
Philip S. Hadji*
This Note argues the legal and political case for a Kurdish state in 
Iraq. After some background on the Kurds, the Note begins by outlining the 
elements of self-determination and concludes that the Iraqi Kurds possess 
the right of self-determination. Next, the Note argues the Iraqi Kurds could 
secede from Iraq in a manner that gains international support and causes 
minimal disruption to the region through a process of “earned sovereign-
ty.” Finally, the Note argues that American support of a Kurdish state in 
Iraq would benefit the United States. The newly formed state would be a 
secular democracy positioned in a strategically significant part of the 
world, could be a strong American ally, and would reaffirm the United 
States’ commitment to human rights.  
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the calamity in Iraq since the United States invasion in 
2003, there is hope in the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq. Compared to the 
rest of the country, violence in the Kurdish region has been relatively mi-
nor.1 In many other parts of the country, by contrast, different ethnic groups 
living in close proximity to one another have engaged in high levels of sec-
tarian violence.2 At times, this violance was best described as civil war.3
The relative stability in the Kurdistan region has allowed the Iraqi 
Kurds to enjoy the country’s highest living standard and highest level of 
foreign investment.4 Moreover, the region is stable enough to allow the Iraqi 
Kurds to engage in foreign relations with other countries and even host 
travelers and businessman from Europe.5 While the level of day-to-day vi-
olence in Iraq has largely subsided since the invasion U.S. invasion, 
progress has come at a considerable price. Over four thousand American 
troops have died,6 and the total economic cost to the U.S. may easily reach 
1 In its report to Congress in March 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense noted the 
Kurdish region remains “the least violent region of Iraq.” U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE,
MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ, REPORT TO CONGRESS 29 (Mar. 7, 2008). The 
Economist colorfully characterized the Kurdish region as “a haven of peace in a sea of tur-
moil.” Does Independence Beckon?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2007, at 47.  
2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, PUBL’N
NO. GAO-07-1197, SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS 
NOT MET MOST LEGISLATIVE, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC BENCHMARKS 50–54 (2007). 
3 See James D. Fearon, Iraq’s Civil War, 86 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 2–15; 
Nicholas Sambanis, Op-Ed., It’s Official: There Is Now a Civil War in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 
23, 2006, at D13 (defining civil wars as “armed conflicts between the government of a sove-
reign state and domestic political groups mounting effective resistance in relatively conti-
nuous fighting that causes high number of deaths”). 
4 Michael Rubin, American Enterprise Inst., Is Iraqi Kurdistan a Good Ally?, MIDDLE 
EASTERN OUTLOOK, Jan. 8, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080107_22 
566MEO01Rubin_g.pdf . 
5 Id.  
6 Sam Dagher, Helicopter Crash in Iraq Kills 4 Americans, in Biggest Toll Among G.I.’s 
Since September, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A14. 
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over two trillion dollars.7 More than two million Iraqis—almost ten percent 
of the prewar population—have fled to neighboring countries.8
The stability and autonomy that the Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed since 
the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 has presented the Iraqi Kurds with a 
tremendous opportunity. The Kurds have long dreamed of having their own 
sovereign state, and have suffered greatly as a result of not having their own 
state. Most notably, they were the victims of a genocide inflicted by Sad-
dam Hussein, which took the lives of as many as 182,000 civilians.9 Given 
this unfortunate history, and their position as the largest ethnic group in the 
world without a country, the Iraqi Kurds have quite a compelling case for 
statehood.  
This Note argues the legal and political case for a Kurdish state in 
Iraq. The first section provides background on the Kurds and Iraq. The 
second section outlines the elements of self-determination and considers 
whether the Iraqi Kurds possess the right of self-determination. The prin-
ciple of self-determination is that distinct groups of people have the legal 
right to determine for themselves to what state they wish to belong.10 Given 
their common background, history, language, and culture, the Note con-
cludes that the Iraqi Kurds qualify as a distinct group of people and there-
fore possess the legal right of self-determination.11
The third section addresses whether the Iraqi Kurds could secede 
from Iraq in a manner that gains international support and causes minimal 
disruption to the region. The secession of Kosovo—through the process of 
“earned sovereignty”—demonstrates how a country can gradually secede 
from its parent state with minimal disruption. This Note argues that based 
on its success in Montenegro, Northern Ireland, and Kosovo—and the simi-
larity between the religious and ethnic conflicts in these countries and 
Iraq—the “earned sovereignty” approach could be followed in the Kurdish 
region of Iraq to successfully execute a secession with broad support and 
minimal disruption.12
Finally, the Note examines the interests of the United States in the 
region. Ultimately, the legality of a Kurdish secession from Iraq will be 
judged by whether states choose to recognize the new country.13 Given that 
7 Jamie Wilson, Iraq War Could Cost U.S. Over $2 Trillion, Says Nobel Prize-Winning 
Economist, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 7, 2006, at 16. 
8 Sudarsan Raghavan, War in Iraq Propelling A Massive Migration, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 
2007, at A18. 
9 Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, July 
1993, http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALPRE.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
10 See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.  
11 See infra Part II.A–D.  
12 See infra Part III.C–D.  
13 See infra Part III.E.  
516 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:513 
the United States has invested tremendous resources in the Iraq war and is a 
highly influential country, the support of the United States would greatly 
help the Iraqi Kurds. Supporting Kurdish statehood would be in the best 
interest of the United States.14 A Kurdish state would allow the United 
States to exit Iraq on a positive note by helping form a self-supporting, se-
cular democracy. Moreover, the newly formed state would be positioned in 
a strategically significant part of the world and could be a strong American 
ally.  
I. BACKGROUND
Despite their long history in the Middle East, the Kurds still do not 
have their own state. With a population of thirty-five million people, they 
are the largest ethnic group in the world without a state.15 The Zakrus 
Mountains, which separate Iran from Iraq, are considered to be their histori-
cal homeland.16 Today, most Kurds live in what are now the countries of 
Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.17
A Kurdish state has long been the dream of Kurds. The dream came 
close to reality after World War I, when the Kurds were promised a state in 
the Treaty of Sèvres.18 Article 62 of the Treaty of Sèvres called for “a 
scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas.”19 The 
Treaty also specified that the Kurds had the right to petition the League of 
Nations for independence.20 Turkey, however, did not accept the Treaty, and 
it was never ratified. Instead, it was replaced with the Treaty of Lausanne, 
which made no mention of Kurdish statehood.21
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 Special Verdict, Case No 1/ CSecond/2006, Al Anfal, Iraq High Tribunal, Second Crim-
inal Court, at 38 (2007), available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-
blog/anfal/opinion.asp [hereinafter Anfal Case]. 
16 In the Cimmerian language, “Kurds” means “residents of the mountains,” which is 
appropriate considering the terrain of the region. Id.
17 See infra Figure One; SUSAN D. MOELLER, COMPASSION FATIGUE 38 (1999). 
18 See Brendan O’Leary & Kahled Salih, The Denial, Resurrection, and Affirmation of 
Kurdistan, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ 3, 4 (Brendan O’Leary et al. eds., 2005). 
19 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey art. 62, Aug. 10, 
1920 (never ratified, superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne), reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT’L L.
179 [hereinafter Treaty of Sèvres].  
20 Id. art. 64. 
21 O’Leary & Salih, supra note 18, at 4.  
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Figure One: Map of Kurdish-Inhabited Areas22
Prior to the British invasion during World War I, the area that is 
now known as the modern state of “Iraq” was under Ottoman rule.23 The 
area was made up of three provinces around the towns of Basra, Baghdad, 
and Mosul, occupied mostly by Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds, 
respectively.24 At the conclusion of World War I, the borders of the Middle 
East were drawn by the European allies at the Conference at San Remo in 
April 1920.25 The allies made borders that were essentially straight lines 
drawn on a map of the Middle East that did not consider the traditional 
boundaries of the region.26 The borders divided some tribes and placed rival 
tribes together. The British were given control of Basra, Baghdad, and Mo-
22 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Map, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at The 
University of Texas at Austin (1992), http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_ 
asia/kurdish_lands_92.jpg (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).  
23 WILLIAM R. POLK, UNDERSTANDING IRAQ 67 (Harper Perennial 2006). 
24 CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ 8 (3d ed. 2007). 
25 COURTNEY HUNT, THE HISTORY OF IRAQ 61 (2005).  
26 Id. 
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sul, and decided to combine the three provinces into one territory that would 
later become the state of Iraq.27 By deciding to combine the three provinces, 
the British ignored the clear territorial and ethnic distinctions in the name of 
preserving what was historically called “Mesopotamia.”28 Most strikingly, 
“the British had no empathy or understanding of the cultural impact of 
combining the Shiite and Sunni segments of the [territory into one] coun-
try.”29 These arbitrary borders split the Kurds into three countries—Iran, 
Iraq, and Turkey—and left them without a state.30
The Iraqi Kurds have suffered greatly as a result of their not having 
an independent state. Under the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Kurds 
have been the victims of crimes against humanity and genocide. Most nota-
bly, in the late 1980s the Iraqi armed forces launched what is known as the 
Anfal campaign. During the Anfal campaign, “Iraqi armed forces . . . sys-
tematically destroyed more than four thousand Kurdish villages and several 
small cities.”31 In 1987 and 1988 the Iraqi armed forces unleashed chemical 
weapons and organized the deportation and execution of Kurdish civilians.32
As many as 182,000 Kurdish civilians were killed, making the Anfal cam-
paign one of the deadliest atrocities in the last thirty years.33 With the help 
of the international community, the Iraqi High Tribunal convicted the Anfal 
campaign’s leaders of genocide, the most severe crime in the world.34
A de facto Kurdish state emerged in Northern Iraq following the 
Gulf War in 1991.35 Ironically, an American decision during the Gulf War 
intended to prevent any Kurdish state gave the Kurds the relative indepen-
dence that they now enjoy. In the midst of an air campaign in February 
1991, George H. W. Bush called on the Iraqi military and people to overth-
row Saddam Hussein. However, Bush declined to move troops into Bagh-
27 POLK, supra note 23, at 82.  
28 INTER-ALLIED COMM’N ON MANDATES IN TURKEY, THE KING-CRANE COMM’N REPORT
(1919), available at http://www.ipcri.org/files/kingcrane.html (“We recommend . . . that the 
unity of Mesopotamia be preserved. . . . It should probably include at least the Vilayets of 
Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. And the Southern Kurds and Assyrians might well be linked up 
with Mesopotamia. The wisdom of a united country needs no argument in the case of Meso-
potamia.”). 
29 HUNT, supra note 25, at 62. 
30 Id. 
31 Peter W. Galbraith, What Went Wrong, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra 
note 18, at 235–36. 
32 Id. at 236. 
33 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 9.  
34 Anfal Case, supra note 15, at 38 (convicting Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as “Chemical 
Ali” and five other military leaders of Saddam Hussein’s regime of genocide for their role in 
the Anfal campaign ). 
35 Michael M. Gunter, Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq, 23 J. OF MUSLIM MINORITY 
AFF. 9, 9 (2003). 
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dad to overthrow Saddam Hussein. This decision allowed Saddam Hus-
sein’s army to move north and suppress a rebellion of Shiites and Kurdish 
rebels trying to overthrow Saddam.36 Fearing for their lives, as Iraqi forces 
advanced into Northern Iraq, hundreds of thousands of people fled to the 
Turkish and Iranian borders. The Turks refused to let the Kurds into Turkey, 
but allowed reporters to televise pictures of people “dying in a sea of human 
agony.”37 These pictures prompted the Bush administration to re-intervene 
in Iraq.38 The United States protected the region by implementing a no-fly 
zone and creating a “safe haven” that effectively gave the Iraqi Kurds de 
facto control of the territory.39
In May 1992, the Kurds held the first genuinely democratic election 
in the history of Iraq. This parliamentary election ended in a virtual tie be-
tween the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabanni. After the 
election, the two main parties decided not to have a run-off election but to 
share power in a Council of Ministers. In the mid-1990s, this power sharing 
arrangement collapsed and an intra-Kurdish civil war ensued. The war was 
ended in September 1998 with help from American mediation.40
After the civil war, the Kurdistan region was divided into two ad-
ministrations, both claiming to be the Kurdistan Regional Government. At 
the time the Iraqi Constitution was passed, it was not clear which govern-
ment was meant by the Kurdish regional government—as referred to in the 
Constitution—because there were effectively two governments. Since the 
Iraqi Constitution was approved by the Iraqis, the KDP and the PUK signed 
the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement (Unification 
Agreement), which outlined how the two parties would share power in one 
government, on January 21, 2006.41 The agreement calls for rotating the 
position of Prime Minister between the KDP and the PUK. Initially, the 
KDP will control the post of Prime Minister and the PUK will control the 
newly created position of Vice President of the Region. The PUK also will 
initially have the position of Speaker of the Kurdistan National Assembly. 
Despite all of this turmoil, the two administrations have started to 
function like the government of a sovereign state. United Nations Resolu-
tion 986, which ensured that thirteen percent of Iraq’s oil revenues would be 
36 Peter W. Galbraith, Kurdistan in Federal Iraq, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ,
supra note 18, at 268. 
37 Id. at 269. 
38 Id.
39 Gunter, supra note 35. 
40 Peter W. Galbraith, Kurdistan in Federal Iraq, supra note 18, at 269. 
41 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement, Jan. 21, 2006, 
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=04030000&rnr=107&anr=8891 (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
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spent on projects in the Kurdistan region, greatly helped the Kurds.42 More-
over, with the revenue from the Oil-for-Food program, Kurdistan stabilized 
and began to grow its economy.43 Although Northern Iraq has functioned as 
a de facto independent state since 1991, no country recognizes this state.44
During the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurdistan re-
gion’s army, fought alongside the Americans in the campaign to oust Sad-
dam Hussein from power.45 With the fall of Saddam after the U.S. invasion, 
the Kurdish region gained even more autonomy and was completely freed 
from the control of an oppressive dictator.  
Compared to the rest of the Iraqis, the Iraqi Kurds enjoy the coun-
try’s highest living standard, highest level of foreign investment, and the 
highest level of security.46 They are engaging in foreign relations with other 
countries and even hosting travelers and tourists from Europe.47 Although 
they are pleased with being liberated from Saddam and having more control 
over their region, the Iraqi Kurds have not yet achieved their ultimate dream 
of obtaining a fully independent sovereign state. 
II. THE IRAQI KURDS POSSESS THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The principle of self-determination is that distinct groups of people 
have the legal right to determine for themselves to which state they wish to 
belong. The idea was first articulated by President Woodrow Wilson at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.48 President Wilson analogized self-
determination to the American ideal of democracy and promoted it as the 
“foreign extension of American norms of political fairness.”49 Self-
determination now is firmly grounded in international law and both the U.N. 
42 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAQ: OIL-FOR-FOOD 
PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS, AND ILLICIT TRADE 2–4 (2003). 
43 See Gunter, supra note 35, at 9.
44 Gunter, supra note 35, at 9.  
45 Rubin, supra note 4, at 2. 
46 Id. at 1. 
47 Id.
48 Woodrow Wilson, Reply of President Woodrow Wilson to the Addresses of the Imperi-
al German Chancellor, and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (Feb. 11, 1918), reprinted in OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS AND PEACE 
PROPOSALS, DECEMBER 1916 TO NOVEMBER 1918, at 265, 268 (James B. Scott ed. 1921) 
(“‘Self-determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which 
statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”). 
49 Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 177, 180 (1991). 
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Charter50 and resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly incorporate the 
principle.51
In order for a group of people to attain the right to determine their 
political destiny—i.e., to choose which state they belong to—the group 
must be sufficiently “distinct.” The criteria for establishing what groups of 
people are sufficiently “distinct” can be split into objective elements and 
subjective elements. Objective elements include “common racial back-
ground, ethnicity, language, religion, history and cultural heritage.”52 To 
satisfy the subjective element, the group has to perceive itself collectively as 
a distinct “people.”53
The right to self-determination can include the right to secession in 
certain cases. Generally, under international law, no country or group of 
people has the right to violate the territorial integrity of a country. However, 
self-determination trumps territorial integrity when a country has: (1) vi-
olated the “economic, social, and cultural development” of a people, as re-
quired by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2625;54 and (2) the people 
have a valid territorial claim to the area that they wish to claim.55 In the case 
of genocide, territorial integrity yields to self-determination.56 In addition, 
50 The U.N. Charter provides the foundation of self-determination. See U.N. Charter art. 1, 
para. 2 (declaring the purpose of the United Nations is “[t]o develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination”); Id. art. 55 
(concerning the promotion of international and social cooperation based on self-
determination); Id. art. 56 (pledging all members will enforce article 55); Id. art. 73 (using 
the terms “self-government . . . political aspirations . . . [and] progressive development of . . . 
free political institutions” even though self-determination is not explicitly mentioned).  
51 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. 
A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970) (noting that when a country does not conduct itself in compliance 
with “the principle of equal rights and self-determination . . . all peoples have the right to 
freely determine . . . their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”).
52 PUBLIC INT’L LAW AND POLICY GROUP & NEW ENGLAND CENTER FOR INT’L LAW AND 
POLICY, THE NAGORNO-KARABAGH CRISIS: A BLUEPRINT FOR RESOLUTION 18 (2000), at 18, 
available at http://www.nesl.edu/center/pubs/nagorno.pdf [hereinafter NAGORNO-KARABAGH 
CRISIS REPORT].
53 Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Se-
cede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 257, 276 (1981). 
54 THE NAGORNO-KARABAGH CRISIS REPORT, supra note 52, at 22. 
55 Gregory J. Ewald, The Kurds Right to Secede Under International Law: Self-
Determination Prevails Over Political Manipulation, 22 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 375, 
397–98 (1994). 
56 See Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response 
to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 779, 841 (1976) (noting “[t]he denial of funda-
mental human rights for the sake of preserving the territorial integrity of a body politic is 
incompatible with the newly emerging principle of jus cogens.”); UMOZURIKE O.
UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1972) (noting that “[i]f the 
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de facto independence is a special factor that strengthens the right to self-
determination over maintaining the territorial integrity of a state.57 When a 
group—such as the Kurds—is the victim of genocide, has a valid territorial 
claim, and has achieved de facto statehood, the case for self-determination 
trumping territorial integrity is quite compelling. 
A. The Kurds Satisfy the Objective Elements of Self-Determination 
Based on their common language, religion, ethnicity, history, and 
culture, the Kurds satisfy the objective elements required to possess the 
legal right of self-determination. The Kurds share the common language of 
Kurdish. Although Kurdish is commonly referred to as a language, there are 
four distinctive dialects.58 The dialects are similar enough that they are 
commonly referred to as simply “Kurdish.” Schools and universities teach 
Kurdish and both broadcast and print media use Kurdish as well.59 In the 
Kurdish region, Arabic hardly is used at all. In fact, few Kurds under twen-
ty-five even understand Arabic.60 Moreover, schools are starting to teach 
English as much as Arabic as a second language.61
The Iraqi Kurds share a common religion. Almost all of the Kurds 
are Sunni Muslim. More importantly, the Kurds share a similar outlook on 
the role religion should play in society. The Kurds believe that the Iraqi 
Kurdistan should remain secular.62 In the Kurdish region, all religious 
groups and sects are allowed to freely follow their religious practices.63
Finally, the Iraqi Kurds are a distinct ethnicity with a common his-
tory. They are a distinct ethnicity that “dates back to 2000 BC when the first 
principle of territorial intergrity (sic) is clearly incompatible with that of self-determination, 
the former must, under present international law, give way to the latter.”). 
57 See Committee of Jurists, Report on the Aland Islands Question, League of Nations O.J. 
Spec. Supp. 3, at 6 (1920) (“From the point of view of both domestic and international law, 
the formation, transformation and dismemberment of States as a result of revolutions and 
wars create situations  which, to a large extent, cannot be met by the application of the nor-
mal rules of positive law. . . . This transition from a de facto situation to a normal situation de 
jure cannot be considered as one confined entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. 
It tends to lead to readjustments between the members of the international community and to 
alterations in their territorial and legal status.”).  
58 Alexander Dawoody, The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood, 41 J. 
ASIAN & AFRICAN STUDIES 483, 484 (2006). 
59 Ofra Bengio, Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF 
KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra note 18, at 176. 
60 Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1. 
61 Id.
62 Peter W. Galbraith, What Went Wrong, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra 
note 18, at 244. 
63 Molly McNulty, Not to be Forgotten: Children’s Rights in the Permanent Constitution,
in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra note 18, at 143, 156. 
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vanguard of Indo-European-speaking people arrived and settled” in the area 
known as “Kurdistan.”64 There they established their first state, the Medean 
Empire in 600 BC,65 which “disintegrated into smaller kingdoms and city-
states that gradually fell under the domination of the Roman or Parthian 
Empires.”66 After the Medean Empire, “[n]o significant Kurdish state 
emerged until 1171, when the Kurdish tribe of the Ayyubids became a do-
minant political player in Islam.”67 The Ayyubids Dynasty collapsed in 
1249.68 After the collapse of the Ayyubids Dynasty,  “[i]n 1750, a fairly 
large Kurdish kingdom of the Zand was born and continued for 117 years. 
In 1867, however, it collapsed at the hands of the Ottoman Turks. No other 
Kurdish entity was established until 1945.”69 In 1945, “the former Soviet 
Union assisted in the creation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in west-
ern Iran.”70 In less than a year, however, this republic collapsed after the 
Soviets withdrew.71 The Kurds’ struggle for statehood and autonomy over 
the last few thousands of years demonstrates that, despite turmoil and 
upheaval in the region, the Kurds are bonded more by their heritage and 
common history than by any territorial line. 
B. The Kurds Satisfy the Subjective Element of Self-Determination  
The Kurds also satisfy the subjective element of self-determination 
because they perceive themselves collectively as Kurds. Although the Iraqi 
Kurds have been part of Iraq for eighty years, the Kurds do not identify 
themselves as Iraqi and prefer not to be part of Iraq. In January 2004, in the 
span of just one month, two-thirds of Kurdistan’s adults signed a petition 
demanding a vote on whether Kurdistan should remain part of Iraq.72 Im-
mediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds submitted a proposed 
Constitution to the Iraqi Governing Council that would make Kirkuk the 
Kurdish capital and give the Kurds the constitutional right to secede from 








72 Peter W. Galbraith, Kurdistan in Federal Iraq, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ,
supra note 18, at 243. 
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Iraq at any time.73 Although the Sunnis and Shiites rejected this proposal, it 
demonstrated the Kurdish desire for autonomy.74
The common identity of the Kurds has been particularly evident 
since the first Gulf War. Since the war, the Kurds have enjoyed the longest 
period of self-rule in a century, allowing them to freely express their culture 
and identity in substantive and symbolic forms.75 National symbols have 
been displayed throughout the country. Perhaps the most important national 
symbol is a common flag. Kurdish flags fly throughout Kurdish region. 
More strikingly, the Iraqi flag is rarely displayed.76 In addition to the flag, 
the Kurds have developed a Kurdish hymn and have erected statutes and 
portraits of Kurdish heroes, such as Mustafa Barzani and Mahmud 
Barznji.77 Although flags, statutes, and hymns may be only symbols, they 
are significant because they are tangible indications of a Kurdish sense of 
common identity. Given that the Kurds see themselves collectively as Kurds 
and have been fighting for self-rule, there is little doubt that they satisfy the 
subjective element of self-determination. 
C. The Kurds Have a Right to Self-Determination that Includes a Right 
 to Independence   
The right to self-determination in the case of the Kurds outweighs 
the desire to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s 
regime clearly violated the economic, social, and cultural rights of the 
Kurds through the genocide of the Anfal campaign. The strongest rationale 
for declaring self-determination claims superior to territorial integrity 
claims is very simple: democratic self-government is more righteous than 
the feudal, undemocratic, and oppressive values associated with preserving 
territorial boundaries.78 There is no stronger case for applying this rationale 
than in the case of genocide.  
The Kurds have the valid territorial claim necessary to have a right 
to self-determination that includes the right of secession. Since the Kurds 
have occupied the same territorial region for thousands of years—managing 
to stay on their homeland and retain their distinct culture despite both ef-
forts by other countries to take over their land, assimilate them, and general 
regional upheaval—they possess a legitimate claim to the territory.79 Since 
73 Bill Park, Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy, 34 PARAMETERS 18, 20 
(2004). 
74 See id.
75 See Bengio, supra note 59, at 176. 
76 Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1. 
77 Bengio, supra note 59, at 176.  
78 Brilmayer, supra note 49, at 184. 
79 See supra Part II.B–C. 
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the Treaty of Lausanne failed to include an independent Kurdish nation, the 
Kurds subsequently fought the British in Iraq and the Iraqis to obtain an 
independent or autonomous homeland. Based on this history, the Kurds 
have a legitimate claim to the territory. 
D. Kurdish Territory in Northern Iraq Satisfies the Criteria 
 for Statehood 
The qualification of a “state” under international law is defined by 
the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.80 The 
Montevideo Convention requires states to possess all four of the following 
requirements: “(1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) gov-
ernment; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”81 The 
Kurds satisfy all four requirements of the Montevideo Convention. 
First, the Kurdistan region satisfies the permanent population ele-
ment because the Iraqi Kurds are clearly a permanent population of about 
four million people.82 This is more than enough people to qualify as a state 
since countries with populations of less than 300,000 people are recognized 
by the United Nations.83
Second, the Kurdistan region meets the defined territory element 
because even the Iraqi Constitution recognizes the region as a territory.84
The fact that the boundaries of the Kurdistan region have not been defini-
tively settled does not disqualify Kurdistan from being considered a state 
since an entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if 
80 See Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. The Montevideo Convention is the most 
authoritative and most cited source for defining statehood. See, e.g., Thomas D. Grant, The 
Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 414 (1999); 
M. Kelly Malone, Comment, The Rights of Newly Emerging Democratic States Prior to 
International Recognition and the Serbo-Croatian Conflict, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 81, 
83 (1992); J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L. L. REV. 9, 14 
(1991). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law repeats the qualifications of the 
Montevideo Convention and notes that they are “well-established in international law.” Res-
tatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201 cmt. a. (1987) [herei-
nafter Restatement]. 
81 Montevideo Convention, supra note 80, art. 1. 
82 GARETH R. V. STANSFIELD, IRAQI KURDISTAN 33 (2003). 
83 See, e.g., Environment Statistics Country Snapshot: Iceland, http://unstats. 
un.org/unsd/ENVIRONMENT/envpdf/Country%20Snapshots_apr2007/Iceland.pdf (last  
visited Apr. 19, 2009) (population 295,000); Environment Statistics Country Snapshot: An-
dorra, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/envpdf/Country%20Snapshots_apr2007/Andor 
ra.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (population 67,000); Environment Statistics Country Snap-
shot: Tuvalu, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/envpdf/Country%20Snapshots_apr2007 
/tuvalu.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (population 10,000). 
84 Iraq Constitution, art. 4, 113, 137, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450_pf.html. 
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its boundaries are not settled or some of its territory is claimed by another 
state.85
Third, the Kurdistan region satisfies the government element be-
cause it has a government. Although a state is not required to have any par-
ticular form of government, there must be some authority exercising go-
vernmental functions.86 Under Iraq’s Constitution, the central government is 
Baghdad has almost no control. The Constitution recognizes the Kurdish 
region and gives the KRG substantial control of it.87 The KRG has the right 
to cancel federal laws, determine the tax rates of people living in the Kur-
dish region, and control the oil and water in the region.88 In addition, the 
KRG is responsible for security in the Kurdish region and oversees the 
peshmerga fighters, which include about 75,000 Kurdish troops.89 The 
peshmerga are armed troops charged with the vital mission of ensuring that 
the insurgency in Arab-Iraq does not enter the north.90 The KRG is a par-
liamentary system of government similarly structured to European demo-
cracies such as the government in the United Kingdom. The Kurdistan Na-
tional Assembly is the KRG’s democratically elected parliament and has 
been elected five times since 1992.91
Finally, the Kurds will undoubtedly be able to enter into relations 
with other states. In many respects, it appears as if the Kurdish Regional 
Government already is conducting its own foreign policy. The Kurdish Re-
gional Government has established a Department of Foreign Relations and 
has appointed a Head of the Department.92 The KRG receives members of 
foreign governments and conducts both foreign policy and public relations 
independent of Baghdad. Members the U.S. Congress have visited Northern 
Iraq and have been hosted by the Kurdistan Regional Government.93 The 
85 Restatement, supra note 80, § 201 cmt. b (“An entity may satisfy the territorial require-
ment for statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or more of its 
boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory is claimed by another state.”). 
86 Id. cmt. d.  
87 See Iraq Constitution, supra note 84, arts. 4, 113, 137. 
88 Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq: The Way to Go, THE N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 16, 2007). 
89 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE KURDS IN POST-SADDAM 
IRAQ 3 (2008). 
90 Id. at 4.
91 Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1.
92 Press Release, Kurdistan Regional Government, The Department of Foreign Relations – 
Kurdistan Regional Government (Aug. 29, 2007), available at http://www. 
krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=267&lngnr=12&smap=04080000&anr=19906.  
93 See, e.g., Press Release, Kurdistan Regional Government, Gohmert Sees Progress First 
Hand in Kurdistan Region (Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://www.krg. 
org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=73&lngnr=12&smap=02010200&anr=22273 (reporting U.S. 
House of Representatives Members Louie Gohmert and Dana Rohrabacher visited Iraq and 
were hosted by the Kurdistan Regional Government); Press Release, Representative Lincoln 
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Kurdistan Regional Government also has met with the U.S. Secretary of 
State and with the U.K. Foreign Secretary.94 After each of these meetings 
there was a press conference with the U.S. or U.K. leader and KRG Presi-
dent Masoud Barzani.95 Both press conferences looked exactly like those 
held in other recognized countries that these foreign secretaries have visited. 
There were two podiums with flags on each side; noticeably absent from 
both press conferences was an Iraqi flag behind President Barzani. Instead, 
there was a Kurdish flag. The imagery of the press conferences projected a 
powerful message to the international community: the Kurdistan region was 
something far greater than a mere province of Iraq. It was much more sub-
stantial. The KRG was essentially conducting its own foreign policy. Nor-
mally, conducting foreign policy is something reserved for sovereign states, 
not provinces of countries. 
III. THE IRAQI KURDS CAN PEACEFULLY SECEDE THROUGH THE PROCESS 
OF “EARNED SOVEREIGNTY”
Fulfilling the criteria for self-determination and the criteria for 
statehood does not automatically lead to the formation of a new state. In 
order to form a new, independent state, the Kurds must secede from Iraq. A 
poorly-planned secession could jeopardize their chances of international 
recognition, which depends largely on political persuasion. In order to max-
imize their chances of achieving international recognition, the Kurds must 
pay close attention to the concerns of the major international powers.  
Although the Kurds may be entitled to the right of self-
determination under international law, an immediate secession from Iraq is 
not the best way to ensure stability in the region and realistically gain 
enough support in the international community to merit recognition. The 
most viable political option, based on its likelihood of long-term success 
and minimization of short-term violence, is the “earned sovereignty” ap-
proach. 
Davis, Congressman Lincoln Davis Returns from Official CODEL to Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Kuwait (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/lincolndavis/ 
news/releases/2008/080116.htm (reporting Lincoln Davis, Marsha Blackburn, Tim Walberg, 
John Barrow, Brad Miller, and Nikki Tsongas also visited with the Kurdistan Regional Gov-
ernment). 
94 Press Release, Kurdistan Regional Government, U.K. Foreign Secretary and President 
Barzani Discuss Closer Ties (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.krg. 
org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=22021; Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks with Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdish Regional 
Government After Their Meeting (Oct. 6, 2006), available at, http://www. 
state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/73702.htm. 
95 Press Release, Kurdistan Regional Government, supra note 94; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, supra note 94. 
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A. An Overview of the “Earned Sovereignty” Approach 
A gradual transition to an independent state would alleviate con-
cerns about sudden upheaval in Iraq and could be accomplished through 
implementing an “earned sovereignty” approach to self-determination.
Earned sovereignty “entails the conditional and progressive devolution of 
sovereign powers and authority from a state to a substate entity under inter-
national supervision.”96 In short, earned sovereignty is a gradual transition 
of power with international approval. With such an approach, the Iraqi 
Kurds could gradually transition from Iraqi authority to having their own 
independent sovereign state. The successful implementation of the earned 
sovereignty approach in conflicts around the world demonstrates its poten-
tial for success in the Kurdish region of Iraq.
Traditional approaches to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts can 
be characterized as either “sovereignty first” approaches or “self-
determination first” approaches.97 The “sovereignty first” approach is based 
primarily upon the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and politi-
cal independence.98 The “self-determination first” approach is based upon 
the legal principles relating to self-determination and the protection of hu-
man rights.99 In general, state wishing to preserve their territorial integrity 
rely on the “sovereignty first” approach, and secessionist movements rely 
on the “self-determination first” approach. 
History has shown that these two approaches have failed to provide 
acceptable options for structuring peaceful resolutions to conflicts based on 
claims of sovereignty. The main problem with strictly adopting the “sove-
reignty first” approach is that it can justify the actions of regimes that pur-
sue aggressive action against their own people under the auspices of main-
taining territorial integrity and sovereignty.100 Moreover, “the mantra of 
sovereignty has been used by states to shield themselves from international 
action resulting from human rights abuses committed as part of their at-
tempts to stifle self-determination movements.”101 One has to look no fur-
ther than the Anfal campaigns against the Kurds in Iraq to realize how ag-
gressive regimes can use their power under the guise of sovereignty to re-
press minorities.  
The “self-determination first” approach has flaws as well. “Self-
determination” rhetoric has been abused in the past and is often used by 
96 Paul R. Williams & Francesca J. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between 
Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 347, 350–54 (2004). 
97 Id. at 350. 
98 See id. at 350-51. 
99 See id. at 351. 
100 See id. 
101 Id. at 354. 
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rebels to justify violence. In Iraq, the mantra of self-determination has been 
used by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist group, to justify 
violent tactics in the name of achieving independence.102 The risk of endors-
ing a “self-determination first” approach and immediately calling for Kur-
dish succession is that this would simply supply the PKK and other separat-
ist groups in the Kurdish region with international justification and support 
for a potential campaign of violence. Moreover, any violence or terrorism 
by the PKK could be used by Turkey as justification for continuing air cam-
paigns and bombings in Northern Iraq, which are obviously destabilizing to 
the region.103
The “earned sovereignty” approach seeks to address the inherent 
flaws with the “sovereignty first” approach and the “self-determination 
first” approach. In Northern Iraq, the primary advantage of following an 
“earned sovereignty” approach is that it will prevent the Arab majority in 
Iraq and Turkey from using a guise of “territorial integrity” and state sove-
reignty to justify committing horrific acts against the Kurds, similar to those 
done in the past. To the extent possible, an “earned sovereignty” approach 
also will limit the backlash from other states in the region—like Turkey—
that may use “territorial integrity” arguments to maintain current boundaries 
of Iraq at the peril of the Kurds’ human rights. Finally, an “earned sove-
reignty” approach also may address some of the inherent problems with 
strict application of the “self-determination first” approach. An “earned 
sovereignty” approach could reduce the violence caused by separatist rebels 
in the PKK wishing to use any means necessary to form an independent 
state. 
B. The Elements of “Earned Sovereignty” 
There are three main elements of earned sovereignty. The first ele-
ment is shared sovereignty. At this stage, “the state and substate entity may 
both exercise some sovereign authority . . . over a defined territory.”104 The 
second element is institution building. During this stage, the substate works 
with the international community to develop the political infrastructure and 
government institutions needed to handle the increased authority involved in 
successfully administering a sovereign country.105 The third element is the 
determination of the final status of the substate entity and its relationship to 
the parent state. This stage can be resolved through referendum or a nego-
tiated settlement between the state and the substate entity.106 Ultimately, the 
102 Bruce Fein, Unveiling the PKK, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2008, at A13. 
103 See Turkey and Iraq: Raids Across the Border, ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2007, at 79. 
104 Williams & Pecci, supra note 96, at 355. 
105 Id.
106 Id. at 355–56. 
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determination of final status for the substate entity depends on the consent 
of the international community in the form of international recognition.107
C. Successful Implementation of “Earned Sovereignty” Around the 
 World 
The earned sovereignty approach has been implemented successful-
ly around the world. Montenegro, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland are all ex-
amples of successful implementation of the earned sovereignty approach. In 
all three cases, varying degrees of the earned sovereignty approach was 
used to end ethnic struggles.  
1. Montenegro 
Like the Kurds, the Montenegrins have a history of independence in 
spite of regional upheaval.108 After the dissolution of the Yugoslav federa-
tion in 1989, Serbia and Montenegro joined in passing the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.109 According to the U.S. State Depart-
ment, although Montenegro reaffirmed its attachment to Serbia by signing 
the Constitution, a distinct sense of Montenegrin identity persisted.110 Most 
notably, “[t]he government of Montenegro was critical of Yugoslav Presi-
dent Slobodan Milosevic’s 1998-99 campaign in Kosovo, and . . . boycotted 
the September 2000 federal elections, which led to the eventual [fall] of 
Milosevic’s regime.”111
The European Union (EU) brokered a treaty between Serbia and 
Montenegro that allowed for the sharing and gradual devolution of all sove-
reign authority between Serbia and Montenegro.112 The Union Treaty be-
tween Serbia and Montenegro called for three years of shared sovereignty 
followed by a referendum to give final approval of the dissolution of the 
union with Serbia.113 On May 21, 2006, the people of Montenegro passed a 
referendum and Montenegro declared independence from the political entity 
107 Id. 
108 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Eur. and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Montene-
gro (Dec. 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/70949.htm [hereinafter Background Note: 
Montenegro] (explaining that Montenegro resisted the rule of the Ottoman Turks and ma-
naged to maintain its independence at the end of the nineteenth century and “was recognized 





112 Williams & Pecci, supra note 96, at 357.  
113 CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF THE STATE UNION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, art. 60, 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/const_scg.pdf. (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).  
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of Serbia and Montenegro on June 3, 2006.114 Serbia, the European Union, 
and all permanent members of the United Nations Security Counsel, includ-
ing the United States, recognize the Republic of Montenegro’s indepen-
dence.115
With ethnic struggles and political upheaval largely behind it, Mon-
tenegro is poised for peace and economic prosperity. Perhaps the biggest 
political achievement in Montenegro is the progress of EU accession nego-
tiations. These negotiations picked up speed after Montenegro declared its 
independence.116 In October 2007, Montenegro and the EU signed the Stabi-
lization and Association Agreement, which opened up trade between Mon-
tenegro and the EU market.117 The political progress in Montenegro has led 
to economic progress. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2007 reached 
$1.379 billion, which is ten times higher than in 2004.118 Although $1.379 
billion may not seem that high, with a population of only 630,000, invest-
ment per capita is $2,223, which is one of the highest rates in Europe.119
2. Kosovo  
Prior to February 17, 2008, when Kosovo’s parliament declared 
Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, Kosovo was a region in Serbia. In 
1998, Serbia was in turmoil when the Kosovar Albanians sought indepen-
dence from Serbia. The United States and NATO intervened by sending 
planes to bomb the Serbs in order to prevent them from “ethnically clean-
sing” the Albanians.120 After the bombing campaign, on June 9, 1999, 
NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—now the countries of Ser-
bia and Montenegro—“signed an agreement for the withdrawal of Yugoslav 
forces from Kosovo.”121 On June 10, 1999, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1244, creating the United Nations Interim Administration Mis-
sion in Kosovo (UNMIK). Resolution 1244 “provide[s] an interim adminis-
tration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial 
autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and . . . provide[s] 
114 Background Note: Montenegro, supra note 108.  
115 Id.
116 Montenegro Gets Boost for EU Bid, BBC NEWS, Oct. 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7045814.stm.  
117 Id.
118 Background Note: Montenegro, supra note 108.  
119 Id.
120 See Michael R. Gordon & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Sought Shift After Raids Failed to Deter 
Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1999, at A1. 
121 Beth DiFelice, International Transitional Administration: The United Nations in East 
Timor, Bonsia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, and Kosovo – A Bibliography, 35 INT'L J.
LEGAL INFO. 63, 66 (2007). 
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transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the develop-
ment of provisional democratic self-governing institutions.”122
The UNMIK “assumed responsibility for nearly all of Kosovo’s so-
vereign authority.”123 Over time, the UNMIK created a Kosovo Constitu-
tional Framework that provided for a parliament, a president, and a mechan-
ism for gradually transferring power to Kosovo’s governing institutions.124
Since UNMIK transferred power to Kosovo’s governing institutions, Koso-
vo has held elections and the two major Albanian parties have struck a pow-
er sharing deal.125 Both parties in Kosovo agreed that the first priority in 
Kosovo was to declare independence and worked with the United States and 
the European Union to calm fears about instability in the region before dec-
laring independence.126
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo’s parliament declared Kosovo’s in-
dependence from Serbia.127 Following Kosovo’s declaration, the U.S. and 
several European states officially recognized the independence of Koso-
vo.128 However, Serbia and Russia refused to recognize Kosovo’s indepen-
dence.129    
Although some suggest that Kosovo may fall into civil war again, 
the amount of political progress in Kosovo has been tremendous. Ten years 
ago, thousands of ethnic Albanians that were living in Kosovo were forced 
to flee their homes out of fear for their lives.130 NATO officials estimated 
that 118,000 ethnic Albanians had been forced out of Kosovo since Serbian 
tanks moved into Kosovo.131 The city of Pec, which had a population of 
about 100,000 ethnic Albanians before the Serbs moved in, was almost to-
tally destroyed.132 For the first time in history, Kosovo has its own sove-
reign state and will no longer be subject to the oppression of the Serbs.    
122 S.C. Res 1244, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
123 Williams & Pecci, supra note 96, at 361 n.41. 
124 Id. at 366–67.  
125 See Kosovo Parties Reach Power Sharing Deal, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 7, 2008, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/07/europe/kosovo.php. 
126 Id.
127 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Eur. and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Kosovo 
(Dec. 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm [hereinafter Background Note: 
Kosovo]. 
128 Nicholas Kulish & C. J. Chivers, U.S. and Much of Europe Recognize Kosovo, Which 
Also Draws Expected Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, at A10.  
129 Id. 
130 Background Note: Kosovo, supra note 127.  
131 Gordon & Schmitt, supra note 120.  
132 Id.  
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3. Northern Ireland 
Since the Irish declared independence in 1916, there has been bitter 
conflict in Northern Ireland between Protestants who wished to remain part 
of the United Kingdom and Catholics who wanted to join the Republic of 
Ireland.133 In the thirty years of violence known as “the Troubles,” more 
than 3,700 people died in sectarian fighting and conflict with the British 
Army in Northern Ireland.134 The Good Friday Agreement halted more than 
a century of turmoil in Northern Ireland and it governs the political relation-
ship among Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and Great Britain.135
The Good Friday Agreement provides for the creation of institu-
tions in Northern Ireland and the gradual devolution of substantial power to 
the newly created institutions.136 In addition, the Good Friday Agreement 
specifies that the people of Northern Ireland have the right to decide for 
themselves the issue of unification with Ireland through a referendum.137
Progress on all of the major elements to the Good Friday Agreement has 
been made.138 In particular, the security situation in Northern Ireland has 
reached a safe level. The IRA disarmed and is no longer considered a terror-
ist threat.139
After over a century of conflict and more than twenty years of 
failed attempts to reach a peaceful arrangement, the Good Friday Agree-
ment is the first real chance for a long-term peaceful solution. With the 
prospect of lasting peace ahead of it, Northern Ireland’s economy has im-
proved. This is evident in both the employment market and in real estate.140
Although Northern Ireland has even greater potential for economic growth, 
lasting peace will allow for significant long-term advances. 
D. Adopting an Earned Sovereignty Approach in Northern Iraq 
The relative peace and prosperity in Montenegro, Kosovo, and 
Northern Ireland illustrate that “earned sovereignty” effectively can be used 
133 Colleen J. O’Loughlin, Peace Process Perspective Northern Ireland and the Agreement 
Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations Belfast, April 10, 1998, 13 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 91,
93–96 (1998). 
134 Alan Cowell & Eamon Quinn, Two Former Enemies Are Sworn In to Lead Northern 
Ireland’s Government, N.Y. TIMES, May, 9, 2007, at A8. 
135 See Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 751.  
136 Williams & Pecci, supra note 96, at 357.  
137 Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, supra note 135. 
138 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Eur. and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: United 
Kingdom (Jan. 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm. 
139 Id.
140 A Time of Peace: Improbable and Exhilarating, Self-Government is Back, ECONOMIST,
May 12, 2007, at 60.  
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to end sovereignty-based conflict in countries that have been plagued by 
war and violence. All three examples are relevant to the case of the Kurds in 
Northern Iraq because of the similarities between the conflicts. Like North-
ern Iraq, the Balkans and Northern Ireland have had a long history of vi-
olence and ethnic struggle. Montenegro and Kosovo were both formed after 
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.141 Like Yugoslavia, Iraq’s boundaries 
were created by foreign states.142 In addition, like Yugoslavia, Iraq is a con-
glomerate of distinct ethnic groups grouped under an umbrella state. The 
conflict in Northern Ireland also shares relevant similarities with Northern 
Iraq. Like Northern Iraq, Northern Ireland had a long-lasting conflict be-
tween two countries with distinct religious traditions. Given the success of 
the “earned sovereignty” approach in these countries, it is appropriate to 
follow a similar approach in the Kurdish region of Iraq. 
Adopting an earned sovereignty approach in Northern Iraq could 
potentially insure lasting peace and prosperity. The first two phases of im-
plementing an “earned sovereignty” approach to conflict resolution are 
“shared sovereignty” and institution building.143 The relationship between 
the semi-autonomous Kurdish region and Iraq already can be properly de-
scribed as shared sovereignty. Shared sovereignty is characterized by a pe-
riod where the substate entity is given substantial elements of self-
government.144 Since the first Gulf War, Iraqi Kurdistan has been autonom-
ous and the Iraqi Kurds have been forced to govern themselves. In all of 
Iraq, the Kurdish region has the most experience with the democratic 
process. The Kurds have their own Parliament—elected five times since 
1992.145 The power of the Kurdish people to govern themselves is not only 
evident in the Kurdish Parliament, but also in the executive arm of the Kur-
dish Regional Government, which oversees all of the ministries and depart-
ments of the government. 
Compared to Montenegro, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, the Kur-
dish region is more advanced at the inception of its pursuit of statehood in 
terms of the institutions that are necessary to have a fully-functioning dem-
ocratic government. The Kurdish region already administers local govern-
ment services.146 In addition, the region has already begun building legisla-
tive institutions needed in a democratic government, including a democrati-
141 Background Note: Montenegro, supra note 108. 
142 See id.; infra, notes 25–32 and accompanying text.
143 See supra Part III.B.  
144 Williams & Pecci, supra note 96, at 361.  
145 Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1. 
146 Id.    
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cally elected Parliament that passes legislation. Lastly, the foreign policy 
institutions and leadership have already begun to conduct foreign policy.147
In states with a history of violence and conflict, security is a major 
concern. Northern Ireland historically has been plagued by extreme 
groups—such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that use terrorism as a 
way of promoting its goals. The peace process in Northern Ireland illu-
strates that a gradual approach to sovereignty can successfully facilitate the 
disarming of extreme terrorist groups such as the IRA.148 Like in Northern 
Ireland, the Kurdish region has its own extreme group, the PKK.149 If it was 
possible to disarm the IRA in Northern Ireland through a gradual transition 
of sovereignty, it seems quite plausible that the same thing can be done in 
Northern Iraq to eventually disarm extreme groups like the PKK. On the 
security front, some progress has been made in the Kurdish region, but there 
is a long way to go.150 In Northern Ireland, the U.K. still maintains security 
in Northern Ireland. In contrast, the Kurdish region is already ahead of 
Northern Ireland with respect to implementing its own security force.151 The 
security force is controlled by the Kurds. Baghdad police, or even foreign 
forces, are barely present in the region.152   
Settling border disputes is the Kurds’ primary challenge. The main 
dispute regarding the boundaries of the Kurdistan region is determining the 
fate of the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding region. The Kirkuk region is 
immediately adjacent to the official Kurdistan region and is populated pre-
dominately with Kurds.153 Although the Kirkuk region was historically part 
of the territory of the Kurds, the Kurdistan region reflects the borders drawn 
by Saddam Hussein and does not include the Kirkuk region. Saddam Hus-
sein did not want to include Kirkuk in the Kurdistan region because Kirkuk 
is rich with oil.154 The Kurds would like this area to be officially recognized 
as part of the Kurdistan region since it was historically a part of their territo-
ry, contains a Kurdish majority, and has been administered as if part of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government territory since 1992. The current Iraqi 
147 See supra Part II.D.  
148 See supra Part III.C.  
149 See Andrew Lee Butters, Hitting the Kurds From All Sides, TIME, Dec. 27, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1698549,00.html (noting that the PKK is a 
militant group that finds refuge in the “lawless mountain region”).  
150 The government-sanctioned Kurdish peshmerga militias are unable to rid Northern Iraq 
of the PKK largely because the peshmerga are overstretched in Baghdad and Mosul trying to 
keep Arab insurgents from entering Kurdistan. Id. 
151 A time of peace: Improbable and exhilarating, self-government is back, supra note 140.   
152 Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1.  
153 Peter W. Galbraith, Kurdistan in Federal Iraq, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, at 
276. 
154 Id. 
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Constitution calls for the people living in the Kirkuk region to determine for 
themselves whether they would like to be part of the Kurdistan region.155
Even though settling border disputes will prove challenging, it is something 
that must be done regardless of whether or not the Kurdistan region be-
comes an independent state. 
Lastly, the most important work left to be done is establishing pro-
tections for the minorities in the Kurdistan region. This can be done by 
building up the Justice Ministry of the KRG and making sure that the legal 
system is effective. The Kurdish Regional Government has taken the initial 
step of recognizing the importance of protecting human rights by creating a 
Ministry for Human Rights and appointing a Minister to lead the depart-
ment.156 Failure to convince the international community of its ability to 
protect the rights of minorities would be a fatal blow to international recog-
nition. 
E. Recognition of a Kurdish State is Dependent on Politics and 
 Diplomacy 
The legality of a potential Kurdish secession would ultimately be 
judged by whether or not the international community recognizes Kurdistan 
as a state. Although recognition is not an element of statehood, failure to be 
recognized would greatly impair Kurdistan’s political and economic rela-
tions with other countries.157 For example, the territory of Northern Cyprus, 
which is not recognized by any country other than Turkey, suffers harm to 
this day because of its illegal secession.158 The EU does not have diplomatic 
155 Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1. The Constitution specified that the referen-
dum was to be held in December 2007 but it was postponed. There is great controversy about 
who gets to vote in the referendum. Iraqi Kurds believe that Arabs that moved to the region 
during Saddam Hussein’s “Arabization” process should not have the right to vote. Even if 
one were to accept this position, it would be very difficult to determine who exactly came to 
Kirkuk as a result of the “Arabizaiton” process. See Soner Cagaptay & Daniel Fink, The 
Battle for Kirkuk: How to Prevent a New Front in Iraq, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POLICY,
Jan. 16, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2552. 
156 See Yousif Mohammad Aziz, Minister for Human Rights, http://www.krg.org/ 
articles/detail.asp?rnr=136&lngnr=12&anr=11188&smap=04060100 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2009). 
157 See Restatement, supra note 80, § 202 cmt. b (noting that statehood is not dependent on 
recognition by other states).  
158 In 1974, Turkish armed forces invaded and occupied a portion of Northern Cyprus. In 
November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declared the occupied part of Cyprus to be 
an “independent state.” Andreas J. Jacovides, Cyprus: The International Law Dimension, 10 
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL’Y 1221, 1228 (1995). The U.N. Security Council condemned the 
unilateral declaration as well as all subsequent secessionist acts. It also declared them illegal 
and called for an immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops. S.C. Res. 541, ¶2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/541 (Nov. 18, 1983) (noting that attempts to create a “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus” are “legally invalid”). The U.N. Security Council then called upon all states not to 
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relations with Northern Cyprus and refuses to trade with them. Moreover, 
the EU has punished Turkey for recognizing Northern Cyprus by using it as 
a reason to stall Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.159 In sum, although 
international recognition is not a requirement for statehood, it is a highly 
desirable goal for the Iraqi Kurds.    
Kurdistan’s chances of gaining international recognition will greatly 
increase if it works with the international community to gradually “earn” 
sovereignty. Montenegro, Northern Ireland, and Kosovo demonstrate that 
working with the international community is a powerful way to build up the 
political capital necessary to gain recognition from other states in the inter-
national community.160 More specifically, Kosovo demonstrates that major 
international powers will recognize a newly formed state regardless of 
whether the former parent state recognizes the new country. With Kosovo, 
western countries recognized Kosovo even though Serbia, the parent state, 
strongly opposed recognition.161 This is an important precedent for a Kur-
dish state because it shows that the United States and other powerful coun-
tries could realistically recognize Kurdistan even if Iraq objects. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SUPPORT KURDISH STATEHOOD
Given that the United States is a highly influential country and has 
invested tremendous resources in the Iraq war, gaining its support is espe-
cially important if the Iraqi Kurds hope to secure recognition from other 
states. Therefore, it is necessary explore the interests of the United States 
regarding Kurdish statehood. Ultimately, Kurdish statehood is in the best 
interest of the United States and the United States should fully support Kur-
dish statehood. 
A. Kurdish State Would Allow the U.S. to Exit Iraq on a Positive Note 
With the exception of the Kurdish region, Iraq has been in great 
turmoil since the U.S. invasion in 2003. Sectarian violence has been a huge 
problem162 and the Iraqi central government has not been able to meet most 
of the political benchmarks set by the United States.163 However, in the 
Kurdish territory of Iraq, the U.S. invasion and occupation has been largely 
recognize the purported state set up by the secessionist actors, nor to facilitate—or in any 
way assist—the secessionist entity. S.C. Res. 550, ¶3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/550 (May 11, 1984). 
Turkey is the only state in the world that has accorded recognition to the illegal “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.” Jacovides, supra, at 1228.  
159 See EUR. PARL. DOC. A5-0091/2003 (Mar. 26, 2003). 
160 See supra Section III.C.  
161 See Kulish & Chivers, supra note 128, at A10. 
162 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 50–54. 
163 Id .at 4.  
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beneficial. The Kurds are enjoying more autonomy than ever before and 
have not been plagued by the sectarian violence found in the rest of the 
country.164 Assisting the Kurds achieve statehood would allow the United 
States to exit Iraq on a positive note. 
An independent Kurdish state would be a secular, self-supporting 
democracy, consistent with the values of the United States. Former Presi-
dent George W. Bush consistently has maintained that spreading democracy 
in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East is a major justification for the Iraq 
war and the United States’ ongoing presence in Iraq.165 Although spreading 
democracy is a commendable goal, it is unlikely that democracy can thrive 
in areas with high rates of sectarian violence. Supporting the independence 
of the Kurdish territory would allow democracy to take hold in a more sta-
ble region. Moreover, the Kurdish region has more experience with democ-
racy than any other part of Iraq. There have been five parliamentary elec-
tions in the Kurdistan region since 1992.166 If the United States is truly 
committed to spreading democracy in the Middle East, supporting Kurdish 
statehood is its best opportunity to see democracy thrive there. 
The secular democracy found in the Kurdish region reflects Ameri-
can values. Secularism and freedom of religious expression are American 
values firmly embedded in the U.S. Constitution.167 These values are shared 
by the Iraqi Kurds.168 In contrast, Iraqi Shiites believe that Islam must be the 
basis for Iraqi law.169 This belief has caused Iraq to “express[] reservations 
on the issue of freedom of religion.”170 Deeply rooted divisions about the 
proper role of religion in government will paralyze the effectiveness of any 
centralized government responsible for all of Iraq. An independent Kurdish 
state will not be burdened with fights over the role of religion in govern-
ment. 
Lastly, an independent Kurdish state would not be a financial bur-
den on the international community. The large oil reserves in the Kurdistan 
region could support the country economically.171 The United States has 
committed itself to helping Kosovo function as an independent state through 
tremendous financial aid.172 In contrast, a Kurdish state could prosper inde-
164 See supra notes 7 and 77–80 and accompanying text.  
165 See Tyler Marshall, Bush's Foreign Policy Shifting, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 5, 2005, at A1. 
166 Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1.  
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
168 See McNulty, supra note 63, at 156.   
169 Galbraith, supra note 33, at 244.  
170 McNulty, supra note 63, at 156.  
171 Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1.  
172 Kulish & Chivers, supra note 128, at A10 (explaining that the U.S. gave $77 million in 
aid to Kosovo in 2007 and would raise that amount to roughly $335 million in 2008).  
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pendently and would not burden the United States or the international com-
munity. 
B. Newly Formed State Would Not Disrupt Region  
Critics of Kurdish statehood maintain that a Kurdish state would 
cause chaos in the region and ultimately lead to more destruction of human 
life. This fear is based on the idea that the Kurds that live in the surrounding 
countries of Turkey and Iran will either want to join the newly created Kur-
distan or cause rebellion in their own countries.173 While there is always a 
chance that Kurds in Turkey and Iran will rebell with the formal recognition 
of a Kurdish state in Iraq, this fear seems overstated considering the fact 
that Kurds living in Turkey and Iran have not caused any major disruptions 
in the wake of the de facto Kuridsh state that has existed in Iraq since 2003. 
Moreover, the United States and other powerful countries can take measures 
to insure that the recognition of a Kurdish state does not cause regional 
upheaval. For example, the United States can pressure Turkey to refrain 
from moving troops into the Kurdistan region and negotiate with the Kur-
dish Regional Government to condition its diplomatic recognition on a 
commitment to directly reign in terrorist groups, such as the PKK.174   
Even if the United States fails to prevent Kurdistan’s neighbors 
from intervening, that does not justify a policy of continuing to deprive the 
Kurds of their own state. The level of disruption should be taken into ac-
count when weighing the benefits of allowing secession against the prob-
lems it could create.175 It is very difficult for critics of Kurdish statehood to 
claim that the loss of the Kurdistan region would unduly disrupt Iraq. The 
oppression that the Kurds have suffered at the hands of Saddam Hussein 
and the refugee problem caused by the turmoil since the U.S. invasion have 
been far greater disruptions to the country than what would result from 
eventual Kurdish secession—especially considering the sucession would 
really be a continuation of the de facto Kurdish state.176 Given the amount 
of violance in Iraq since the U.S. invasion, it is hard to imagine that the re-
sult of gradually liberating the Kurdistan region would profoundly disrupt 
the country. 
173 See ELIZABETH FARRIS & KIMBERLY STOLTZ, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE FUTURE 
OF KIRKUK: THE REFERENDUM AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON DISPLACEMENT 1 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/0303_iraq_ferris/0303_iraq_ 
ferris.pdf. 
174 Many prominent U.S. leaders see Kurdistan as an ally and support protecting it. Secre-
tary of State Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and former U.N. Ambassador Ri-
chard Holbrooke are among the prominent leaders who have called for the U.S. to protect 
Kurdistan militarily, following withdrawal from Iraq. Galbraith, supra note 88. 
175 See Ewald, supra note 55, at 401.  
176 See Id.  
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C. Kurdish State Would be a Strong U.S. Ally in a Strategically 
 Significant Region 
Even though the Middle East is vital to the economic interests of 
the United States—with its abundance of oil—the United States lacks allies 
near or among the Middle Eastern countries with large oil reserves. While 
many argue that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are strong allies, both of these 
countries have proven unreliable in the past. Turkey consistently has refused 
to help the United States when it is needed most—during times of war. Tur-
key did not allow the United States to use its military bases in Southern 
Turkey as a platform to attack Iraq from the north in March 2003.177 This 
refusal is part of a history of non-cooperation with the United States. In 
1979, Turkey refused the U.S. request to allow U-2 intelligence flights over 
Turkish airspace “unless Moscow agreed,”178 and in May 1989, Turkey re-
jected an American request to inspect an advanced Soviet fighter plane 
flown by a Soviet defector to Turkey.179 While Saudi Arabia was a key ally 
in the Gulf War in 1993, its government refused to allow American planes 
to carry out strikes from bases in Saudi Arabia in the 2003 Iraq war.180    
Given the lack of U.S. allies in the Middle East and the region’s 
importance to vital U.S. economic and security interests, an independent 
Kurdistan could be an important ally given its close proximity to Iran, Syria, 
and Iraq.181 The Kurds would be receptive to assisting the United States 
because Kurdistan would be a newly formed state and benefit tremendously 
from the security that comes along with being an ally of the United 
States.182 The Kurds might even allow the United States to build a military 
base in Kurdistan since the Kurds would benefit significantly from knowing 
that none of its neighbors would attack a country with a U.S. military 
base.183 A military base, or at least use of Kurdish bases, would benefit the 
United States greatly. The U.S. could use the base to strike at al Qaeda in 
adjacent Sunni territories, limit Iran’s progress on nuclear weapons, and 
177 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Iraq, 11 MIDDLE EAST POL’Y 106, 109 (2004).  
178 Bernard Gwertzman, Turkey Would Bar U-2 Use of Airspace if Soviet Objected, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1979, at A1. 
179 Stephen Engelberg, Turkey Rebuffed U.S. Plea to Examine Defector’s MIG, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1989, at A12.  
180 Stephen J. Hedges, Military to Leave Saudi Arabia, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 30, 2003, 
at C1.  
181 See Figure 1, supra Part I. 
182 The security benefit of U.S. support to the Kurdistan Regional Government was evident 
“in July 2003, when the United States apprehended some 11 Turkish commandos in Sulay-
maniya apparently seeking to . . . destabilize the de facto Kurdish government and state in 
northern Iraq.” Gunter, supra note 177, at 109.  
183 See Galbraith, supra note 88 (discussing the advantages of supporting an independent 
Kurdish state). 
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protect Israel.184 In short, supporting Kurdish statehood would give the 
United States a tremendous ally in a strategically significant part of the 
world.   
CONCLUSION
The case for Kurdish statehood in Iraq is quite compelling. At the 
end of World War I, the Kurds missed a great opportunity for statehood 
when the Allies redrew the borders in the Middle East.185 Since being left 
without a state, the Kurds have suffered tremendously at the hands of oth-
ers. Most notably, the Kurds were the victims of a genocide inflicted by 
Saddam Hussein during the Anfal campaign.186 With the fall of Saddam 
Hussein, the Iraqi Kurds have an incredible opportunity to fulfill their 
dream of statehood.   
Based on their common background, history, language, and culture, 
the Iraqi Kurds are a distinct group of people and, therefore, possess the 
legal right of self-determination.187 Not only do the Iraqi Kurds possess the 
right of self-determination, but they could successfully secede from Iraq 
with broad support and minimal disruption to the region. Kosovo, Northern 
Ireland, and Montenegro illustrate that the process of “earned sovereignty” 
can successfully end sovereignty-based struggles in countries with tremend-
ous histories of religious and ethnic turmoil. The similarity between the 
religious and ethnic conflicts in these countries and Iraq provides hope that 
the same approach could be followed in the Kurdish region of Iraq.  
Kurdish statehood has the potential to be the best thing to emerge 
from the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The image of the U.S. has been severely 
tainted in the international community since the invasion of Iraq.188 It is not 
often that foreign policy provides a country an opportunity to serve its own 
interest while simultaneously improving the lives of a people on the other 
side of the globe. Strong U.S. support of Kurdish statehood would help re-
store America’s image in the international community and garner the sup-
port of a new ally in a strategically significant area. The United States 
should not miss the chance to reward a people haunted by the pain and suf-
fering of genocide and the opportunity to offer a beacon of hope to all future 
generations of humankind aspiring for democratic self-rule. 
184 See id.  
185 See supra notes 20–28 and accompanying text.  
186 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.  
187 See supra Part II.A–C. 
188 See, e.g., Nick Childs, Israel, Iran Top “Negative List,” BBC NEWS, Mar. 6, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6421597.stm (illustrating the negative image of the 
United States through polling by the BBC World Service). 
